In approaching this issue, I posed several questions. What changes were required in the recharter bill to satisfy most of the objections raised in the veto message? What would have been the likely effect of these changes on the operations of the bank? My
analysis led to the conclusion that a national bank so altered would not have been significantly different from the existing institution.
Therefore, the failure of the pro-bank faction to take seriously Jackson's publicly stated reservations was a tactical error of major proportions. Grounds for compromise --including virtual capitulation to Jackson on most issues --did exist, and they were printed for everyone to read and consider in the published veto message.
The main objections to the recharter bill related to (1) the continuation of the bank's monopoly status (the only institution with a federal charter and interstate branching), (2) the payment of a sizable bonus for the charter privilege (alleged to be a bribe), First, the Second Bank did not require monopoly status to assure its profitability.
It could have competed with other federally chartered banks if any had been subsequently created. Indeed, since no other prominent politician in either party was calling for multiple bank charters at the federal level, monopoly status was unnecessary. Correspondingly, the bank had no incentive for paying a $3 million bonus to obtain this superfluous privilege. The bank did not need to retain its foreign stockholders to continue normal operations. Its stock had paid dividends steadily since 1823 and was considered a gilt-edge investment. American Bank supporters never gave a compromise solution as outlined above, or any other compromise, serious consideration. They were as righteous as the Jacksonians. Cocksure, they set out to meet every one of the president's arguments head on. They risked all or nothing --and ended up with the latter. Blame for the failure of the Second Bank of the United States to gain recharter and continue as a positive force in the American economy must be laid at least equally, and perhaps more so, on the shoulders of Biddie and his associates. Many of the complaints raised by Jackson in the veto message were exaggerated, but a bank modified slightly to meet six of his specific objections would have undoubtedly remained a viable financial institution. Whether an attempt at compromise would have been successful can, of course, never be determined, yet we can ascertain that the failure of bank supporters to pursue such a reasonable course was shortsighted and self-defeating.
